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Comparable Worth in the United States 
and the Canadian Province of Ontario 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, the continuing wage disparity between male 
and female workers has garnered both national and international 
attention. l Although a portion of this wage gap can be attributed 
to nondiscriminatory factors, studies confirm that a significant 
portion of the wage gap is due to gender-based wage and job 
discrimination. 2 The theory of comparable worth requires em-
ployers to institute equal pay for different jobs that are compa-
rable in value or worth, but are filled predominantly by women 
and men respectively.3 Comparable value is generally determined 
by comparing each of such female- and male-dominated jobs in 
terms of the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions 
required. 4 This theory attempts to eliminate that segment of 
discrimination attributable to employers paying lower wages for 
traditional "female" jobs than they would pay for traditional 
"male" jobs.5 
Comparable worth experts differ significantly in their opinions 
regarding the plausibility and merits of the comparable worth 
theory.6 Advocates of comparable worth legislation argue that 
wages for traditional female jobs have been intentionally de-
pressed through years of discrimination by virtue of their female 
I See generally NAT'L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, CLOSING THE WAGE GAP: AN INTER-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1988) [hereinafter CLOSING THE WAGE GAP]. 
2 See Pay Equity: Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Value: Joint Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Human Resources, Civil Service, Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House 
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1982) [hereinafter 
Hearings on Pay Equity] (statement of Sr. Janet Norwood, Commissioner, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). 
3 Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1728, 1728-29 (1986). 
4 CLOSING THE WAGE GAP, supra note 1, at 3. 
5 Weiler, supra note 3, at 1728. 
6 See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination and Job Segre-
gation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Survival of a 
Theory]; Nelson, Opton, & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory 
in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231 (1980). 
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status. 7 Opponents of comparable worth legislation argue that 
the lower wages paid to females in traditional female jobs reflect 
objective market factors such as lower levels of skill, decreased 
demand for labor, and increased supply of labor rather than 
relative merit. 8 
In addition, opponents of comparable worth legislation esti-
mate the cost of implementing pay equity for jobs of equal value 
at 5 percent of the employer's total payroll. 9 This added cost 
arguably would result in substantial added production costs, 
squeezing an employer's profit margin and seriously threatening 
the continued vitality of the business. Advocates of comparable 
worth legislation respond that these costs to the employer are 
"reasonable expenses necessary to eliminate discrimination as a 
cost of doing business."lo 
The United States has yet to adopt legislation incorporating 
the comparable worth theory. This Comment focuses on the 
progress of comparable worth theory in the United States in 
contrast to that in Ontario, which recently adopted the most 
progressive comparable worth legislation in the world. II Part I of 
this Comment examines the legislative and judicial history of 
equal pay in the United States. Part II then discusses Canada's 
7 See Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 415-28; see also Survival of a Theory, supra note 6, at 
2-4. 
" See Nelson, supra note 6, at 243-63; see also Weiler, supra note 3, at 1756-59. This 
theory by opponents of comparable worth has been incorporated into the "market de-
fense" theory. See Brodin, Costs, profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 318, 356 (1987). The market defense is not available to employer-defendants 
against claims brought under the Equal Pay Act. The market defense, however, has been 
permitted by courts in Title VII cases. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 
F.2d 716, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1986) (practice of paying market rate is not actionable under 
Title VII despite an employer's knowledge that its wage structure disadvantages women 
and its ability to alter wage structure in favor of comparable worth); American Fed'n of 
State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (the decision to base compensation on the market instead of on the theory of 
comparable worth is too complex to be appropriate under this type of claim); Spaulding 
v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); 
Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 
(1980); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.O. Wis. 1982). At least one court 
has questioned the validity of the market rate defense under Title VII. See Kouba v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing the employer to use prior 
salary as the basis for a new employee's salary only if the employer had an acceptable 
business reason for doing so). 
9 Weiler, supra note 3, at 1771-72. 
10 Brodin, supra note 8, at 359. 
II See An Act to Provide For Pay Equity, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 34 (1987) [hereinafter 
Ontario Act]. 
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federal equal pay standard and the circumstances preceding On-
tario's adoption of the Ontario Pay Equity Act (Ontario Act). Part 
III of this Comment contrasts the provisions of the Ontario Act 
with present U.S. law on pay equity. This Comment concludes 
that current U.S. law has had little impact in narrowing the wage 
gap, and that the United States, therefore, should adopt com-
parable worth legislation on a national level. In this regard, the 
Ontario Act should serve as an appropriate model for effectively 
eliminating gender-based discrimination in the wage structure. 
I. U.S. PROGRESS IN ADOPTING A COMPARABLE WORTH 
STANDARD 
A. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 
Despite slow and steady progress by women in the labor market 
in both the United States and Ontario, the wage gap has remained 
fairly constant. 12 Since 1955, for example, the U.S. female-male 
annual earnings ratio of full time, nonseasonal workers has av-
eraged approximately 60 percent. 13 This figure represents the 
total wage gap including that portion attributable to sex-based 
wage discrimination. In 1973 and 1974, the ratio representing 
the total female-male wage gap was as low as 57 percent. In 1987, 
this ratio reached a new high of 65 percent. 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (Equal Pay Act) was an important 
first step towards addressing gender-based wage discrimination 
in the United States. 14 The Equal Pay Act requires employers to 
12 NAT'L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, BRIEFING PAPER #1: THE WAGE GAP 1 (1989) 
[hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER #1]; see also Abella, Employment Equity, 16 MANITOBA L.J. 
185,185-89 (1987). 
13 BRIEFING PAPER #1, supra note 12, at 1-2. 
14 29 U.S.c. § 206(d) (1982). Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act as an amendment to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1982). The Equal Pay Act 
was a result of the Kennedy Administration's efforts to introduce equal pay legislation. 
Hearings on H.R. 8898 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education 
and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 8898]. In 1962, two 
bills identical in content, were introduced calling "for work of comparable character on 
jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills .... " H.R. 8898, 87th Congo 
1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 10226, 87th Congo 2d Sess. (1962). The Kennedy Administration 
urged Congress to adopt the "comparable" language in the bills. Hearings on H.R. 8898. 
Despite its efforts, both the House and the Senate adopted an equal work standard which 
contained language significantly narrower than that proposed by the Kennedy Adminis-
tration. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); see also County of Washington v. Gunther, 422 U.S. 
161, 186 (1981). 
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pay males and females equal pay for the same jobs. The Equal 
Pay Act states that equal pay is required for 
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed un-
der similar working conditions, except where such payment 
is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; 
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality 
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor 
other than sex.IS 
A prima facie claim under the Equal Pay Act is established 
when a plaintiff demonstrates that she earns a lower wage than 
a male who performs equal work within the same establishment. 16 
Although the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act demon-
strates a clear congressional intent to reject the comparable worth 
standard which advocates equal pay for different work of equal 
value as opposed to equal pay for the same work, the courts have 
allowed some flexibility for plaintiffs by interpreting the equal 
work standard to mean "substantially equal."17 Under this stan-
dard, male and female jobs challenged under the Act do not have 
to be identical but merely substantially equal in terms of skill, 
effort, responsibility, or working conditions. IS 
For example, in applying the Equal Pay Act standard, the 
Supreme Court has found the jobs of male and female industrial 
inspectors to be substantially equal despite the fact that men were 
required to work the day and night shifts as opposed to women 
who worked only the day shift.19 The Third Circuit, in applying 
the substantially equal standard, has equated male and female 
"selector-packers" even though the male employees performed 
extra tasks. 20 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has equated male hos-
pital orderlies and female nurses aids despite extra tasks per-
formed by the orderlies.21 The Fifth Circuit also has applied the 
substantially equal standard, equating the work of female and 
15 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 
16 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
17 See, e.g., Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 203; Brennan v. Prince Williams Hosp. Corp., 
503 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. City Stores, 479 F.2d 235, 240-41 (5th Cir. 
1973); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 
(1970). 
18 See Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 199. 
19 [d. at 203 n.24. 
20 Shultz, 421 F.2d at 266. 
21 Prince Williams Hosp., 503 F.2d at 291. 
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male retail sales clerks employed within different departments in 
the same clothing store.22 Thus, the courts have consistently ac-
corded plaintiffs a degree of flexibility in interpreting the equal 
work standard.23 
If a plaintiff can successfully demonstrate that the jobs in ques-
tion are substantially equal, the burden of proof shifts to the 
employer-defendant.24 The defendant must then demonstrate 
that the difference in pay is validated by one of the Equal Pay 
Act's four affirmative defenses. 25 An affirmative defense is invalid 
if it contains any evidence of sex discrimination.26 In addition, a 
red-circle rate-that is, "a higher than normal rate given to an 
employee based on exceptional reasons" such as a temporary 
reassignment--cannot be used to maintain wage differentials for 
equal work over an extended period of time.27 Similarly, an em-
ployer cannot argue that a pay differential is based on an em-
ployee's status as head of a household28 or that the average cost 
of employing a male is lower than for a female. 29 If the plaintiff 
can prove the existence of a prohibited sex-based wage differ-
ential, the employer is required to increase the wage rate of the 
lower paid sex. 30 
Thus, the scope of the Equal Pay Act seems very narrow, re-
stricted solely to males and females performing the same type of 
work.31 The courts have not considered any claims under the Act 
alleging that two disparate occupations are comparable in value. 
Instead, plaintiffs have brought these types of claims under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 
B. Title VII 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
prohibiting employment and wage discrimination, subsequent to 
22 City Stores, 479 F.2d at 240-41. 
23 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. 
24 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.12(c)). 
25 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.12(a)). 
26 Id. "A seniority system which provides periodic increases is invalid [under the Equal 
Pay Act] if it prescribes dual wage rates for men and women performing equal work." 
27 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.15(b)). 
28 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.13). 
29 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.14). 
so 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.15(a)). 
Sl See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986); 
American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 
F.2d 1401, 1401-05 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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the adoption of the Equal Pay Act. 32 Title VII forbids discrimi-
nation in all aspects of employment including compensation on 
the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."33 Title 
VII in its original form did not contain the term "sex."34 This 
term was inserted in an unsuccessful last minute attempt to block 
the bill's passage.35 The Senate considered the effect of Title VII 
and its potential interaction with the provisions of the Equal Pay 
Act. 36 The result was the Bennett Amendment which exempted 
from Title VII those employers that "differentiate on the basis 
of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation 
paid ... if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of 
[the Equal Pay Act]."37 On its face, this provision appears to vitiate 
the inclusion of the sex-based discrimination prohibition. 
Initially, most courts considering wage discrimination claims 
under Title VII held that the Bennett Amendment required 
plaintiffs to meet the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard. 38 
Recent courts, however, have concluded that the Bennett Amend-
ment does not require plaintiffs to meet the Equal Pay Act's 
narrow equal work standard. These courts have interpreted the 
amendment to incorporate only the Act's affirmative defenses. 
In 1981, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict in County of 
Washington v. Gunther, concluding that the Bennett Amendment 
"merely incorporates" the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses 
and does not restrict plaintiff's claims to the Equal Pay Act's 
narrow equal work standard.39 
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982) [hereinafter Title VII]. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a(r) (1982). 
34 See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,51 MINN. L. 
REV. 877, 880-82 (1967). 
35 [d. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia opposed the passage of Title VII and 
proposed an amendment which added the term "sex" to the language of Title VII in an 
effort to get others, who had supported the bill to aid blacks, to reject it. Bellace, 
Comparable Worth: Proving Wage Based Discrimination, 69 IOWA L. REV. 655, 665 n.54 (1984). 
36 See Miller, supra note 34, at 882. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a(h) (1982). 
38 See, e.g., Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 725 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Lemons 
v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir. 1980); Ammons v. Zia 
Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971). Recently, however, courts have interpreted the 
Bennett Amendment to incorporate in Title VII only the Equal Pay Act's affirmative 
defenses. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981); Inter-
national U. of Elec. v. Westinghouse Elec., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
39 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 163-71, 181. 
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C. Gunther: Interpretation of the Bennett Amendment and Title VII 
In County of Washington v. Gunther, respondents, female guards 
in a female section of a county jail, charged that they were paid 
less than male guards in a male section of the jail. The district 
court noted that the male guards supervised ten times as many 
prisoners per guard than the female guards and that more of the 
female guards' work was devoted to clerical duties. In dismissing 
respondents' claims, the court noted that the jobs were not "sub-
stantially equal," and that as a matter of law, sex-based wage 
discrimination claims could not be brought under Title VII unless 
the claim satisfied the standards of the Equal Pay Act.40 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed and stated that the claim was not barred merely 
because the jobs were not substantially equal.41 The court of 
appeals remanded the case to the district court with instructions 
to consider evidence demonstrating that part of the disparity 
between the female and male pay rates was attributable to sex 
discrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that re-
spondents' failure to meet the Equal Pay Act's equal work stan-
dard did not preclude a cause of action under Title VII. 
It is significant that the Gunther majority expressly stated that 
it "did not decide ... the precise contours of lawsuits challenging 
sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII." Rather, the 
Court merely determined that the Bennett Amendment did not 
require respondents to meet the equal work standard of the Equal 
Pay Act, but was instead constructed merely to incorporate the 
Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses. The Court emphasized, 
however, that respondents' claims were not based on "the contro-
versial concept of 'comparable worth.'" The Court noted further 
that respondents could not succeed under Title VII unless they 
could demonstrate that their wages were depressed as a result of 
intentional sex discrimination. 
Gunther resolved the meaning of the Bennett Amendment but 
failed to establish whether plaintiffs could present evidence dem-
onstrating alleged wage disparities between the sexes in different 
jobs of comparable value.42 Although it did not entirely rule out 
40 [d. at 165 (citing Gunther v. County of Washington, 20 FEP Cases 788, 791 (Ore. 
1976». 
41 [d. at 165 (citing Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 
1979), supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing, 623 F.2d 1302, 1313, 1317 (1980)). 
42 Dowd, The Metamorphosis of Comparable Worth, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 833, 841 (1986). 
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comparable worth claims brought under Title VII, the Court 
urged caution against recognizing such causes of action.43 
D. The Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Theories Under 
Title VII 
Claims under Title VII have been brought under two theories 
of discrimination: the disparate impact theory and the disparate 
treatment theory.44 The disparate impact theory was first recog-
nized in Griggs v. Duke Power CO.45 In that case, the Supreme 
Court determined that race discrimination could be established 
by a showing that a facially neutral employment practice operates 
to discriminate on the basis of race or upon members of a pro-
tected group.46 
The courts, however, have shown a strong reluctance to apply 
the disparate impact theory to claims based on comparable worth 
under Title VII.47 In American Federation of State, County and Mu-
nicipal Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, for example, the State 
of Washington had hired an outside consultant to perform a 
comprehensive evaluation of its wage structure. In the course of 
this study, the consultant determined that women were paid lower 
wages than men in comparable state government jobs staffed 
primarily by women.48 The State of Washington ignored the study 
in its determination of appropriate compensation. The AFSCME 
court concluded that the State of Washington's decision to base 
its compensation on competitive market wages rather than a com-
parable worth study did not violate Title VII.49 The AFSCME 
court stated that there was no evidence that the State of Wash-
ington declined to raise the wages of particular workers because 
these workers were female. 50 The Ninth Circuit noted that claims 
43 See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166. 
44 Dowd, supra note 42, at 838. 
45 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971) (employer could not require 
general job qualifications such as the need for a high school diploma or a minimum score 
on an aptitude test if these qualifications produced a disparate impact on minority appli-
cants). 
46 [d. at 431. 
47 See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 1986); 
American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 
F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). 
48 AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405-06. 
49 [d.; see also Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 708 (1984). 
50 AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405-06. 
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based on disparate impact were "confined to cases that challenge 
a specific, clearly delineated employment practice applied at a 
single point in the job selection process." The appeals court fur-
ther noted that it did not believe that this type of claim was 
appropriate under a disparate impact theory. 
The disparate impact theory continues to make little progress 
in the United States.51 In fact, the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio actually raised the plain-
tiff's burden of proof in disparate impact cases. The Court held 
that in order to establish a prima facie case of Title VII disparate 
impact, a plaintiff must go "beyond the need to show that there 
are statistical disparities in the employer's workforce."52 The 
Court found that the plaintiff must also "isolat[e] and identif[y] 
the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible 
for any observed statistical disparities."53 Even if the plaintiff can 
meet this stringent burden of proof, the defendant no longer has 
to show a business necessity, but, instead, need only produce some 
business justification for its practices. The Court will also consider 
"the availability of alternative practices to achieve the same busi-
ness ends" with less discriminatory impact. The burden of proof 
remains with the plaintiff at all times. Wards Cove Packing further 
constricts the application of the disparate impact theory intro-
duced in Griggs, and limits the use of litigation as a means of 
achieving pay equity. 54 
The alternative cause of action available to plaintiffs follows 
from the disparate treatment theory. Under this theory, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a prima facie case of sex discrimination by a 
preponderance of the evidence under Title VIp5 Unlike the 
51 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, -U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124-25 
(1989). 
52 [d. at 2125-26. The majority in Wards Cove Packing relied on Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). 
5. Wards Cove Packing, _U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. 
54 NAT'L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, LITIGATION AS AVENUE FOR PAY EQUITY CLAIMS 
ENDANGERED BY WARDS COVE DECISION, Newsnotes 4 (july 1989). In response to Wards 
Cove Packing, the House and the Senate passed civil rights legislation aiming to restore 
the judicial remedies previously available in claims of job discrimination. See H.R. 4000, 
lOlst Congo 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, lOIst Congo 2d Sess. (1990). The bills would have 
restored the precedent of Griggs and overruled the treatment of business necessity as a 
defense in Wards Cove Packing. Biskupic, Partisan Rancor Marks Vote on Civil Rights Measure, 
CONGo Q., July 21, 1990, at 2312. Nevertheless, President Bush vetoed the legislation on 
October 22, 1990. 
55 American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) V. Washington, 
770 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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disparate impact theory, the disparate treatment theory requires 
the plaintiff to prove a discriminatory intent or motive by the 
employer. Discriminatory intent may be derived from circum-
stantial evidence. 
Under the disparate treatment theory, a majority of courts have 
found proof of discriminatory intent based solely on comparable 
worth studies and job comparisons to be insufficient. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted in AFSCME, "we reject a rule that would penalize 
rather than commend employers for their effort and innovation 
in undertaking such a study."56 Despite the general consensus 
among courts not to allow AFSCME-type comparable worth stud-
ies to serve as proof of intentional discrimination, a few courts 
have allowed recovery on the basis of this type of evidence of 
intentional discrimination. 57 In Taylor v. Charley Brothers, for ex-
ample, the district court found that the plaintiff met the burden 
of proof by demonstrating wage discrimination through job seg-
regation, lower compensation for female jobs, and job compari-
sons commissioned by both the plaintiff and the defendant.58 
Taylor, however, is an exception to the growing trend in courts 
to disallow proof of discriminatory intent based on comparable 
worth studies. 59 
Neither the disparate impact theory nor the disparate treat-
ment theory under Title VII have proven truly successful in U.S. 
courts.60 As a result, the comparable worth doctrine has made 
little progress in assuring equal pay for equal value in the United 
States.61 
II. THE STATUS OF EQUAL PAY LEGISLATION IN CANADA AND THE 
PROVINCE OF ONTARIO 
A. Canadian Equal Pay Legislation 
Canada, on a national scale, has seen little progress in the 
narrowing of the wage gap.62 In 1911, employed women earned 
56 Id. at 1408; see also American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
57 Taylor v. Charley Bros., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Kyriazi 
v. Western Electric, 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.]. 1978). 
58 Taylor, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614. 
59 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
60 See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, _U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). 
61 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
62 Abella, supra note 12, at 185. 
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53 percent of the average wage for men. Over the next seventy 
years, this average wage improved by only 2 to 11 percentage 
points. In Ontario as of 1987, the wage gap was 36 percent, with 
the average full time salary of women at $20,710 and the average 
full time salary of men at $32,120.63 
The legislatures of Canada and Ontario, however, have taken 
significant steps towards adopting a comparable worth standard.64 
In 1978, Canada enacted the Canadian Human Rights Act 
(CHRA or Act) which required pay equity for all federal em-
ployees and other specified employees protected under CHRA. 65 
These employees, however, constitute only 10 percent of the 
female work force. CHRA, therefore, falls short of protecting the 
vast majority of female workers.66 
Section 11 of the Act requires equal pay for work of equal 
value.67 Section 11 provides: "It is discriminatory practice for an 
employer to establish and maintain differences in wages between 
male and female employees employed in the same establishment 
who are performing work of equal value." The language "work 
of equal value" is the U.S. equivalent of comparable worth.68 The 
Act also established the Canadian Human Rights Commission 
(CHRC), which is responsible for administration and enforce-
ment of the Act's provisions.69 The CHRC investigates complaints 
from individuals and assists in the negotiation of dispute settle-
ment. 70 
Although the Act is significantly broader in scope than U.S. 
equal pay legislation, its narrow application is limited to federal 
and other specified employees. Each Canadian province must 
enact its own equal pay legislation to protect the balance of the 
female work force.7 1 The most recent and progressive example 
63 THE PAY EQUITY COMMISSION, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: PAY EQUITY IN THE WORK-
PLACE 2 (1989) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS]. 
64 See Canadian Human Rights Act, ch. 33, § II, 1976-1977 Can. Stat. 890; Ontario Act, 
supra note II. 
65 Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 64. 
66 CLOSING THE WAGE GAP, supra note I, at 10. 
67 Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 64. 
68 CLOSING THE WAGE GAP, supra note I, at 3. 
69 Canadian Human Rights Act, ch. 33, § 21(1), 1976-1977 Can. Stat. 890. 
70 Id. at §§ 32(1), 38(1)(2). Since its establishment, twenty-four cases have been brought 
before the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) involving nearly 8000 workers 
with awards totaling approximately $37 million including back pay. CLOSING THE WAGE 
GAP, supra note I, at II. 
71 See generally, CLOSING THE WAGE GAP, supra note I. 
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of equal pay legislation is the Ontario Pay Equity Act (Ontario 
Act), effective January 1, 1990.72 
B. Equal Pay Legislation in Ontario 
In 1951, Ontario enacted legislation that required equal pay 
for equal work, imposing a standard similar to that under the 
U.S. Equal Pay Act.73 Subsequently, the government of Ontario 
recognized that such legislation, in combination with Canada's 
federal legislation (Section 11 of the CHRA), would not effec-
tively eliminate the pay differential between men and women in 
jobs of equal value.74 In response, Ontario introduced pay equity 
laws for public service and for the broader public sector. The 
legislature combined these two legislative initiatives into Bill 154, 
now known as the Ontario Pay Equity Act. 
Concurrent with the introduction of Bill 154 into the Ontario 
legislature, the Ontario government published its Green Paper 
on Pay Equity. The Green Paper specified six principles for On-
tario's pay equity legislation. 75 The Ontario Act subsequently in-
corporated many of the premises of the Green Paper.76 
The Ontario Act is the first legislation in the world to "proac-
tively require implementation of pay equity in both public and 
private sectors."77 The Act requires that the pay in jobs historically 
held by women match the pay for jobs of comparable skills that 
72 Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
73 Todres, With Deliberate Care: The Framing of Bill 154, 16 MANITOBA L.J. 221 (1987). 
74 See Todres, supra note 73, at 221-22. In 1985, the Canadian province of Manitoba 
passed the Manitoba Pay Equity Act (MPEA) which required pay equity for public em-
ployees and certain other specified employees. The MPEA is proactive as compared to 
"complaint driven," similar to the Canadian Human Rights Act. CLOSING THE WAGE GAP, 
supra note 1, at 11. 
75 Todres, supra note 73, at 221-22. The six principles of the Green Paper consist of 
the following: 
1) The purpose of pay equity would be to correct gender-based pay discrimi-
nation only, not to address the issue of general wage levels; 
2) Only female employees and employees in female predominated job groups 
would be eligible for pay adjustments; 
3) Pay equity would not require jobs to have identical value-a range of values 
would be permitted; 
4) Equal value comparisons would be limited to a given employer's establish-
ment-in other words, comparisons would not be made between wages paid by 
one employer and those paid by another; 
5) The legislation would not be retroactive-no retroactive adjustments would 
be required; and 
6) Wage reductions would not be permitted. 
76 See Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
77 CLOSING THE WAGE GAP, supra note 1, at 11. 
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are usually held by men.78 The Ontario Act covers approximately 
1.7 million working women.79 
III. PAY EQUITY UNDER THE ONTARIO ACT 
A. Mechanics of the Ontario Act 
The Ontario Act seeks to eliminate "that portion of the wage 
gap that has resulted from the historical undervaluation of wom-
en's work."80 The Ontario Act requires pay equity81 in all public 
sector establishments82 and in private sector establishments83 with 
ten or more employees.84 Furthermore, the Ontario Act requires 
all employers in public and private sector firms with 100 or more 
employees85 to develop and post pay equity plans.86 Private sector 
firms with ten to ninety-nine employees must achieve pay equity; 
they may post plans, but are not required to do SO.87 Compliance 
is required by January 1, 1990.88 
The Ontario Act designates a mandatory posting89 and wage 
adjustment date for each employer depending upon the number 
of employees in each establishment.90 Public employers are the 
first group required to make adjustments, followed by large pri-
vate firms, and then smaller private companies. All employers 
78 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 2. 
79 Freudenheim, A New Ontario Law Matches Women's Wages with Men's, N.Y. Times, July 
27, 1989, at AI, col. 5. 
80 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 2. It is important to note that the Ontario 
Act does not apply to women who work in an all female environment. Todres, supra note 
73, at 225. The Ontario legislature, however, committed itself to study this situation 
further and to make recommendations. 
81 "Pay equity is achieved when the job rate for the female-job class that is the subject 
of the job comparison is at least equal to the job rate for a male-job class in the same 
establishment where the work performed in the two job classes is of equal or comparable 
value." Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 6. 
82 For a list of all employers in the public sector, see id. 
83 Employers in the private sector are defined as "all employers not in the public 
sector." [d. at § 1(1). 
84 [d. at § 3(1). 
85 [d. at § II. An employee does not include a student employed for his/her vacation 
period. [d. at § 1(1). 
86 [d. at §§ II, 12. 
87 [d. at §§ 18, 19. 
88 [d. at § 10; QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 3. 
89 Where the Ontario Act requires that a document describing that employer's pay 
equity program be posted in the workplace, the employer should post the document in a 
prominent area. Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 1(2). 
90 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 3. 
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must begin the introduction of pay equity within a six year period. 
This phase-in allowance will benefit smaller employers who are 
less able financially to implement the pay equity program. 
In order to implement pay equity, employers must first identify 
the number of pay equity plans required for its organization.91 
This is accomplished by determining the identity of the employer, 
the number of employees, and the number of establishments 
within the organization. An establishment consists of all the em-
ployees of an employer within a geographic division.92 An em-
ployer must prepare a pay equity plan for each establishment, 
and if an establishment contains bargaining and nonbargaining 
units, the employer must complete a plan for each unit. 93 
Second, an employer must determine the number of female-
job classes94 and male-job classes95 contained within the establish-
ment.96 Generally, a female-job class is one in which 60 percent 
or more of the members are female, and a male-job class is one 
in which 70 percent or more of the members are male.97 Criteria 
for determining a job class include: similar duties and responsi-
bilities; similar requisite qualifications; same compensation sched-
ules, salaries, grades or ranges of salary rates; and employment 
by similar recruitment methods.98 This determination is impor-
tant because pay raises are based on an employee's membership 
in a determined female- or male-job class. 
Third, once an employer determines its female- and male-job 
classes, the employer must apply an appropriate gender-neutral 
method of comparison to determine whether pay equity exists.99 
Employers are free to develop individualized pay equity plans for 
91 THE PAY EQUITY COMM., PAY EQUITY IMPLEMENTATION SERIES #15 5 (1989) [here-
inafter SERIES # 15). 
92 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 1 (l). 
93 SERIES # 15, supra note 91, at 5. 
94 Under the Act, a female-job class means, "except where there has been a decision 
that a job class is a male-job class as described in clause (b) of the definition of male-job 
class; [where) (a) ajob class in which sixty percent or more of the members are female 
.... " Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 1(1). 
95 Under the Act, a male-job class means, "except where there has been a decision that 
a job class is a female-job class as described in clause (b) of the definition of 'female-job 
class' ... a job class in which seventy percent or more of the members are male .... " 
Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 1(1). 
96 SERIES #15, supra note 91, at 5. 
97 See Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 1 (1). 
98 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 1(1); see also SERIES #15, supra note 91, at 5. 
99 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 12; see also SERIES # 15, supra note 91, at 5. 
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their establishment. loo Furthermore, the Ontario Act does not 
include a model job evaluation system to be used by employers. lol 
The Ontario Act only requires that an employer's system base its 
comparison on skill, effort, responsibility, and working condi-
tions. 102 The system must be free of any gender discrimination 
in the determination of salaries and wages. 103 The Ontario Act 
recognizes that wages for jobs are determined by a number of 
factors including job content and the market factors of supply 
and demand. lo4 Pay equity under the Ontario Act does not dis-
regard the general market rate for male-dominated and gender-
neutral jobs; it merely addresses the inequities within a company. 
Employers collect information from their employees regarding 
the content of their job and use this information to compute the 
relative value of each job to an employer. 105 Job comparison is 
strictly a means to identify the relative worth of jobs within an 
employer's organization. In unionized workplaces, the jobs are 
rated by a committee composed of management and union rep-
resentatives. lo6 Because employers do not have to utilize a specific 
evaluation system, each employer can choose the type of gender-
neutral evaluation system which they feel will best suit their es-
tablishment and work structure. 
Finally, after employers collect job information, they must com-
pare the compensation of job classes determined to have similar 
value. lo7 Data is categorized according to male- and female-job 
class, value, and job rating. When comparing values, compensa-
tion levels include the cost of benefits received by both job 
classes. lOB Where it is found that job classes are of equal value 
and the female jobs are underpaid, compensation in the female-
dominated-job classes must be increased. 109 Both sexes in these 
job classes will receive adjustments. llo Under the Ontario Act, the 
100 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 13; QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 7. 
101 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 7. 
102 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 5(1). 
103 SERIES #15, supra note 91, at 5. 
104 THE PAY EQUITY COMM., PAY EQUITY IMPLEMENTATION SERIES #1 7 (1988) [here-
inafter SERIES #1]. 
105 THE PAY EQUITY COMM., How TO Do PAY EQUITY JOB COMPARISONS 20 (1989) 
[hereinafter JOB COMPARISONS]. 
106 Freudenheim, supra note 79, at A18, col. l. 
107 SERIES #15, supra note 91, at 6. 
108 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 1(1). 
109 [d. at § 6. 
110 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 2. 
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salary of male-dominated classes wiH never be decreased to 
achieve pay equity.lll This provision ensures equal treatment to 
both female and male employees and further protects members 
in a male-job class from unfair wage reduction. 
The Ontario Act provides for periodic adjustments in wages to 
achieve pay equity.ll2 Each employer's pay equity plan must pro-
vide that the female-job class with the lowest job rate will receive 
salary increases higher than those for other female-job classes 
until the former's rate is equal to the lesser of either the wage 
required to achieve pay equity or the wage of the female class 
with the next lowest job rate. ll3 An employer's first adjustments 
in compensation should not be less than either "[1 percent] of 
the employer's payroll during the twelve month period preceding 
the first adjustments; [or] the amount required to achieve pay 
equity."114 The drafters of the Ontario Act also provided for 
phasing in implementation and costs to ease public concern re-
garding the cost of pay equity.ll5 
The Ontario Act incorporates five specific exceptions to the 
pay equity requirement: a formal seniority system; a temporary 
employer training assignment equally available to male and fe-
male employees; a merit compensation system based on formal 
performance ratings; red-circling, which involves the withholding 
of some or all of the increases normally given to an employee 
whose job was found to be overvalued; and a skill shortage re-
sulting in a temporary increase in compensation. 1l6 An employer 
has the burden of proof to demonstrate that either all or part of 
the disparity in wages is due to one of these permissible differ-
ences. These exceptions recognize that pay equity is not neces-
sarily fair and deserved in all specific employment instances and 
that employers need limited discretion to assure fairness in these 
specific cases. 
III Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 9. 
112 Id. at § 13(6). 
113 Id. at § 13(3). 
114 Id. at § 13(4). 
115 Todres, supra note 73, at 223-24. Many opponents of the Ontario Act argued that 
small private companies would be unable to afford the closing of the wage gap which 
would result in companies forcing the additional costs on to consumers. Opponents also 
argued that the cost of pay equity would discourage foreign investment. 
116 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 8(1). 
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The Ontario Act also established the Pay Equity Commission 
(Commission) to aid in the administration and enforcement of 
the Act. ll7 The Commission consists of a Pay Equity Office and 
a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal (Hearings Tribunal).llB The Pay 
Equity Office's duties include the enforcement of the Ontario Act 
and mandates of the Hearings Tribunal. 1l9 The Pay Equity Office 
also develops educational materials, seminars, and workshops de-
signed to aid employer's compliance with the Act. 120 In establish-
ing the Pay Equity Office, the Ontario legislature recognized that 
its pay equity program could not succeed unless employers have 
full access to informational materials on pay equity, and assistance 
in implementing pay equity plans. 
Enforcement of the Ontario Act is also essential to the success 
of pay equity in Ontario. The Ontario Act establishes the Hear-
ings Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body with exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine all questions connected with the ACt. 121 All of its de-
cisions are conclusive. The Ontario Act provides that any em-
ployer, employee, group of employees, or bargaining agent may 
file a complaint with the Hearings Tribunal simply by asserting 
a violation of the Ontario Act. 122 The Ontario Act should increase 
the Hearings Tribunal's enforcement efforts by simplifying the 
procedures through which individual employees may bring ac-
tions against their employers. The Hearings Tribunal appoints a 
review officer who investigates the complaint and may attempt to 
effectuate a settlement. 123 A hearing will then be held if the 
parties fail to settle the claim or request a hearing, or if the review 
officer refers the matter to the Hearings Tribunal. 124 The system 
should be efficient and effective in settling pay equity disputes 
because fewer claims will be adjudicated by the Hearings Tri-
bunal. The Hearings Tribunal may fine an employee not more 
that $2,000 in the case of an individual, and not more than 
$25,000 in any other case. 125 
Il7 Id. at § 27. 
liS Id. at § 27(2). 
119 Id. at § 33(1). 
120 Id. at § 33(2). 
121 Id. at § 30(1). 
122 Id. at § 22. 
123 Id. at § 23(1). 
124 Id. at § 25(1). 
125 Id. at § 26(1). 
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B. A Comparison of the Ontario Act with the Equal Pay Act and 
Title VII 
The wage gap in the United States has remained fairly constant 
throughout the past forty years despite the adoption of the Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII, in contrast to the gradually declining wage 
gap in Canada and Ontario. 126 Opponents of comparable worth 
legislation argue that the wage gap is the result of objective mar-
ket factors and that the gap will naturally decline over an ex-
tended period of time as women continue to enter male-domi-
nated positions in the workforce. 127 Nevertheless, statistics 
demonstrate that the past fifty years of increasing female partic-
ipation in the work force have witnessed little progress in the 
elimination of the wage gap in the United States. 128 Apparently 
then, the wage gap is not the result of objective market factors 
but rather, years of intentional discrimination against females in 
the workforce. 129 Unlike the United States, the Ontario legislature 
has recognized that legislation incorporating a comparable worth 
standard is the only means of eliminating gender-based wage 
discrimination. 130 
The Ontario Act's comparable worth standard is substantially 
broader in scope than the Equal Pay Act's narrow equal work 
standard, and embraces a standard which U.S. courts have con-
sistently refused to apply under Title VII.131 For example, in 
Gunther, although the Supreme Court did not entirely rule out 
the possibility of comparable worth claims under Title VII, the 
Court emphasized that respondents' claims were not premised 
on the comparable worth concept. 132 Since Gunther, U.S. courts 
have continued to reject claims based on the theory of comparable 
worth. 133 Plaintiffs have thus been unsuccessful in obtaining any 
remedy for claims premised on wage discrimination in jobs of 
126 See BRIEFING PAPER #1, supra note 12, at 2. 
127 Nelson, supra note 6, at 243-63. 
128 BRIEFING PAPER # 1, supra note 12, at 2; see also supra notes 12-13 and accompanying 
text. 
129 Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 415-28. 
130 See Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
131 See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981); American 
Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1986); American Fed'n of State, 
County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1401 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
132 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166. 
133 See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 720-21; AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407. 
1991] COMPARABLE WORTH 155 
equal value. V.S. courts will only validate a remedy pursuant to 
the Equal Pay Act's equal-pay-for-equal-work standard. 
Vnder the Ontario Act, the relative value of jobs is determined 
by employer-implemented job evaluation systems. 134 V.S. courts, 
however, continually disallow a plaintiff's use of job evaluations 
to prove wage discrimination. 135 This current trend to further 
restrict plaintiff's use of comparable worth studies as evidence of 
wage discrimination is partially due to the refusal of V.S. courts 
to find fault based on the disparate impact theory.136 Instead, 
V.S. courts have entertained claims under the disparate treatment 
theory, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate an employer's 
intent or motive to discriminate. 
In contrast, the Ontario Act does not distinguish between in-
tentional and unintentional discrimination by an employer. 137 
The Ontario Act recognizes that wage discrimination which re-
sults from the historical undervaluation of women's work should 
be eliminated regardless of an employer's motive unless, of 
course, an employer can justify his or her actions under one of 
the Act's affirmative defenses. 138 Because the Ontario Act does 
not generally consider an employer's motive, courts can employ 
objective criteria to readily enforce the Act. 
Examination of the Ontario Act, the Equal Pay Act, and Title 
VII reveals a number of similar provisions concerning the elim-
ination of gender-based discrimination in wages. 139 Vnder the 
Ontario Act, employers perform job evaluations on the basis of 
skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions to determine 
whether pay equity exists. 14o These four factors are almost iden-
tical to those used to define the basis for determining "equal 
work" under the Equal Pay ACt. 141 It is evident, therefore, that 
the Ontario and V.S. legislatures both accept the use of these 
four factors in the comparison of jobs. 142 
The V.S. legislature and courts, however, only appear to vali-
date the use of these factors in the comparison of equal work, as 
134 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 12. 
135 See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 720-21. 
'36 Id. 
137 See Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
138 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 63, at 2. See also Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
139 See Ontario Act, supra note 11; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-l to -17 (1982). 
'40 Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 5(1). 
'4' See 29 U .S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 
'42 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
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opposed to an equal value standard. I43 In disallowing the use of 
comparable worth studies based on job evaluations, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that studies based on the four factors contained too 
many complex variables to demonstrate wage discrimination by 
the State of Washington. I44 U.S. courts allow some flexibility in 
establishing a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the 
Equal Pay Act by defining the Act's equal work standard as "sub-
stantially equal," as opposed to "identical." The courts have re-
fused, however, to expand the standard to include a comparison 
of different jobs of comparable value. 145 The next logical step for 
U.S. courts is to extend their recognition of the validity of these 
four factors to their use in comparable worth studies. Such rec-
ognition would be a significant and necessary progression towards 
implementing a comparable worth standard in the United States. 
Further, the Ontario Act, the Equal Pay Act, and Tide VII 
each require employers to raise the compensation of female em-
ployees in order to eliminate discrimination. A male's salary may 
never be decreased to achieve pay equity.I46 This ensures equal 
treatment for both sexes and provides security to male workers. 
Another significant congruity between the Ontario Act, the 
Equal Pay Act, and Title VII is that each piece of legislation 
incorporates affirmative defenses available to the employers. I47 
Under all three Acts, employers do not have to pay equal wages 
if they can demonstrate that a wage discrepancy is the result of 
either a merit or seniority system. I48 Red-circling is also an ex-
ception available to employers. I49 
The Ontario Act places the burden of proof on the employer 
to demonstrate that one of the affirmative defenses under the 
Act apply.I50 Similarly, the Equal Pay Act and Title VII tradition-
ally placed the burden of proof on employers. I51 In Wards Cove 
143 See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1986); 
American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 
F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985). 
144 See, e.g., AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1406. 
145 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
146 See Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 9; 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.15). 
147 See Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 8(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The Gunther 
court also interpreted the Bennett Amendment to Title VII to incorporate these excep-
tions. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981). 
148 See Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 8(1); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 
149 See Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 8(1); see also 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.15). 
150 Ontario Act, supra note II, at § 8( I). 
151 46 Fed. Reg. 43,852 (§ 1620.12(c)). 
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Packing, however, the Court implied that the burden of proof in 
wage discrimination claims remains with the plaintiff-employee 
at all times. 152 The employer need only demonstrate some busi-
ness justification for its practices. As a result, the Ontario Act 
provides greater protection to employees against liberal applica-
tion of employer exceptions than its U.S. counterparts. 153 
In addition, both the Ontario Act and Title VII contain a 
limited market defense available to employers. 154 The Ontario 
Act contains a very narrow market exception when employers 
are forced to pay higher wages due to a skill shortage causing 
temporary inflation in compensation. 155 The market defense 
available to employers under Title VII has been interpreted by 
U.S. courts as much broader, falling under the exception of "a 
factor other than sex."156 U.S. employer-defendants have been 
allowed to demonstrate that a wage was the result of objective 
market factors such as supply and demand. U.S. courts, however, 
have refused to allow this market defense for claims brought 
under the Equal Pay Act because of the Equal Pay Act's narrow 
equal work standard. 157 Nevertheless, the availability of this mar-
ket defense to U.S. employer-defendants in Title VII suits makes 
it too easy to defend against plaintiff's claims of unfair gender-
based wage discrimination. In addition, because the wage gap is 
the apparent result of the historical undervaluation of female 
work and not objective market factors, U.S. courts should not 
recognize the market defense as a valid defense of wage discrim-
ination. 158 
Finally, although the cost to U.S. employers of implementing 
pay equity for jobs of equal value could be high, these costs can 
be seen as reasonable expenses necessary to eliminate discrimi-
nation and can be justified as a cost of doing business. 159 With 
careful drafting, U.S. legislators can allow for the gradual phasing 
in of implementation and costs-as provided for by the Ontario 
Act-thereby easing employers' concerns while establishing pay 
equity in jobs of equal value in the United States. 
152 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, _U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). 
153 See Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
154 See id. See also 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-l to -17 (1982). 
155 See Ontario Act, supra note 11, at § 8(1). 
156 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
157 Brodin, supra note 8, at 356. 
158 See Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 415-28; see also Brodin, supra note 8, at 356. 
159 Brodin, supra note 8, at 359. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the comparable worth theory has seen little progress in 
the U.S. legislative and judicial branches, other nations have 
achieved significant advances. The most progressive comparable 
worth legislation worldwide appears to be the Ontario Act, proac-
tively requiring implementation of pay equity plans for both pub-
lic and private employers. 160 Whether the Ontario Act will prove 
successful remains to be seen. Nevertheless, future efforts of 
nations to implement comparable worth legislation may depend 
on its success in reducing the wage gap. Current U.S. legislation 
has done little to narrow this wage disparity. Congress should 
examine the language of the Ontario Act and adopt similar com-
parable worth legislation in an effort to eliminate the gender-
based wage gap in the United States. 
Kathleen Weaver 
160 See Ontario Act, supra note 11. 
